Introduction.-In a stochastic game the play proceeds by steps from position to position, according to transition probabilities controlled jointly by the two players. We shall assume a finite number, N, of positions, and finite numbers Mk, nk of choices at each position; nevertheless, the game may not be bounded in length. If, when at position k, the players choose their ith and jth alternatives, respectively, then with probability sAj > 0 the game stops, while with probability ph! the game moves to position 1. Define s = min s.
Since s is positive, the game ends with probability 1 after a finite number of steps, because, for any number t, the probability that it has not stopped after t steps is not more than (1 -s)t. Payments accumulate throughout the course of play: the first player takes as j from the second whenever the pair i, j is chosen at position k. If we define the bound M:
M.= max la-JI, k,i,j then we see that the expected total gain or loss is bounded by
The process therefore depends on N2 + N matrices Pk-(ptj i = 1, 2, ...,*; j = 1, 2, ...,nk) At -(asjAi = 1, 2, ...,mk; j = 1, 2, ...,nk), with k, I = 1, 2, ..., N, with elements satisfying N pki> 02 aI l < M, E PSJ = 1 -St. < 1 -S < 1.
I=1
By specifying a starting position we obtain a particular game rP. The term "stochastic game" will refer to the collection r = { kI| k = 1, 2, ....
NJ.
The full sets of pure and mixed strategies in these games are rather cumbersome, since they take account of much information that turns out to be irrelevant. However, we shall have to introduce a notation only for certain behavior strategies,1 namely those which prescribe for a player the same probabilities for his choices every time the same position is reached, by whatever route. Such stationary strategies, as we shall call them, can be represented by N-tuples of probability distributions, thus: 
(If we had chosen a(o) to be the value of At, for each k, then at(k) would be the value of the truncated game r( ) which starts at position k, and which is cut off after t steps if it lasts that long.) We His total expected winnings are therefore at least k-(1 -s)max9 -(1 -s)tM/s.
I
Since this is true for arbitrarily large values of t, it follows that x is optimal in rF for the first player. Similarly, y is optimal for the second player.
Reduction to a Finite-Dimensional Game.-The non-linearity of the "val" operator often makes it difficult to obtain exact solutions by means of Theorems 1 and 2. It therefore becomes desirable to express the payoff directly in terms of stationary strategies. Let r = {1"} denote the collection of games whose pure strategies are the stationary strategies of re r is an optimal pure strategy for all; rk e r, and conversely. The value vectors of r and1r are the same. The proof is a simple argument based on Theorem 2. It should be pointed out that a strategy x may be optimal for one game r k (or rk) and not optimal for other games belonging to r (or r). This is due to the possibility that r might be "disconnected"; however if none of the pkj are zero this possibility does not arise.
It can be shown that the sets of optimal stationary strategies for r are closed, convex polyhedra. A stochastic game with rational coefficients does not necessarily have a rational value. Thus, unlike the minimax theorem for bilinear forms, the equation (4) 4 . If we set nk = 1 for all k, effectively eliminating the second player, the result is a "dynamic programming" model. . n costing ci = -ai to apply and having probability si of success. The above then gives us the rule: adopt that procedure i* which maximizes the ratio ai*/si*, or equivalently, the ratio si*/ct*.
